Anderson proposes a bottom-up approach to cognitive ontology revision: Neuroscientists should revise their taxonomies of cognitive constructs on the basis of brain activation patterns across many tasks. We argue that such bottom-up proposal is bound to commit a mistake of reification: It treats the abstract mathematical entities uncovered by dimension reduction techniques as if they were real psychological entities.
Main Text
Reverse inference consists in inferring that a task recruits a psychological process (P) on the grounds that a brain structure (S) is activated during this task (as observed by, e.g., fMRI). It is often assumed that reverse inference is valid only if activation is selective, that is, if the ratio
is high (Poldrack, 2006) . Since brain areas are typically multi-functional, cognitive neuroscientists have grown skeptical of area-based reverse inference. Anderson endorses this pessimistic conclusion-"It should go without saying that we must also curtail the common practice of reverse inference" (Anderson, 2014, 113) -and the first two chapters of After Phrenology extensively review the multifunctionality, hence low selectivity, of brain regions.
One can address the problem raised by multifunctionality in three different ways. First, reverse inference can be reformulated so as to depend on diagnosticity instead of selectivity (Machery, 2014) . In this approach, reverse inference is valid only if the activation discriminates between the recruitment of a first psychological process, P, and of a second psychological process, P', that is, only if the ratio
Second, one can increase the selectivity of brain activation by revising cognitive neuroscientists' brain ontology: Instead of focusing on regional activation, one can reverse infer on the basis of activation in other brain structures (e.g. networks) that may be selectively associated with psychological processes (e.g., Glymour & Hanson, forthcoming) . In Chapter 4 of After Phrenology, Anderson rejects this second approach on the grounds that brain networks too can be multifunctional. Anderson's concern here is speculative, and more evidence is needed before discrediting brain ontology revision.
Large-scale brain networks (e.g., effective connectivity networks), or activation patterns within those networks (e.g., as measured by MVPA), may be far more selective or diagnostic than individual regions. Third, one can increase the selectivity of brain activation by revising cognitive neuroscientists' cognitive ontology: On this approach, activation of brain structures is not selective because cognitive neuroscientists lack the right set of cognitive constructs for describing the functions or computations that these structures perform (e.g., Poldrack, 2010) .
This third approach has led to a lively debate about cognitive ontology revision (Klein, 2012; Lenartowicz, Kalar, Congdon, & Poldrack, 2010; McCaffrey, 2015; Poldrack, Halchenko, & Hanson, 2009; Price & Friston, 2005) . As Anderson perspicuously notes, most "revisionists" have a conservative goal: Taking current cognitive ontology as their starting point, they attempt to validate cognitive constructs by investigating whether they can be selectively associated with brain activation patterns (e.g., Lenartowicz et al., 2010) . By contrast, Chapter 4 of After Phrenology advocates a revolutionary goal.
Anderson's project is not to determine which members of current cognitive ontologies are valid and which are invalid, but rather to propose entirely new cognitive constructs by mining fMRI datasets. Before describing and assessing Anderson's proposal, we note that it is unclear whether his goal is to revolutionize the constructs psychologists are working with (e.g., recommending they stop using the construct of working memory) or, less ambitiously, whether he is proposing a new cognitive ontology for cognitive neuroscientists: In this case, the idea would be to develop novel ways of characterizing what neural structures do.
Anderson's central idea is that cognitive neuroscientists should not characterize the intrinsic function of each brain region-i.e., the operation the region performs independently of its neural context (e.g., its computational function); instead, they should quantitatively characterize each region's disposition to be involved in a given set of tasks.
Anderson calls such dispositions "neural personalities." Neural personalities allegedly vary with respect to some fundamental psychological dimensions (or "neuroscientifically relevant psychological (NRP) factors"), exactly as personality varies with respect to a few dimensions (e.g., extraversion). The dimensions of neural personality need not correspond to existing cognitive constructs, and they must be discovered by examining brain activation across many tasks (more on this below).
Several points about Anderson's proposal are noteworthy. First, the focus on neural personalities instead of intrinsic functions is a radical change of heart for Anderson, who previously advocated characterizing regions' workings-roughly, their contextinsensitive computational functions (Anderson, 2010 attention, phonology, semantics, learning, or working memory. This allows them to represent quantitatively how often, according to a given literature, a given area is activated when one of these 20 processes is recruited by an experimental task, for instance how often articles studying working memory report activation in the dorsal anterior insula. The pattern of recruitment of a given area, given a particular set of fMRI articles and a categorization scheme, is its functional fingerprint. While, unsurprisingly, areas tend to be activated by many processes, their functional fingerprints vary.
Importantly, a functional fingerprint is a mere summary of a data set: It does not explain why the area is activated the way it is. summarizing the involvement of a given area in a set of tasks, as functional fingerprints do, neural personalities explain this involvement: They allow cognitive neuroscientists to claim that because an area has a given neural personality (its score is i on NRP factor 1, j on NRP factor 2, etc.), it is involved more in some tasks than others.
However, dimension reduction techniques are ill suited for discovering new cognitive constructs (Gould, 1996; Glymour, 2001) . These statistical techniques project highdimensional spaces onto spaces with fewer dimensions. On their own, the resulting dimensions cannot be interpreted realistically; they merely provide convenient ways of summarizing high-dimensional data. Three main arguments support this deflationary understanding of dimension reduction techniques. First, the outcome of these techniques is underdetermined. A given set of vectors in a high-dimensional space can be projected onto different spaces with different dimensions. To highlight merely three issues, there are many non-equivalent dimension reduction techniques, the number of dimensions is typically arbitrarily chosen, and these dimensions can be oriented in different manners.
None of the possible spaces should be interpreted realistically since it would be arbitrary to treat one of them as real to the detriment of the others. Second, just like causally-based correlations, accidental correlations can be projected onto a lower-dimensional space, resulting in meaningless dimensions (e.g., Gould, 1996, 280) . Thus, that a highdimensional space can be projected onto a lower-dimensional space does not justify interpreting the resulting dimensions realistically. Finally, the capacity of dimension reduction techniques such as factor analysis to identify causes has not been validated (Glymour, 2001, chapter 14) . These three arguments bear on Anderson's project, exactly as they bear on IQ and personality research: On their own, dimension reduction techniques do not justify interpreting the dimensions of neural personalities realistically.
Forgetting their limitations is committing the error of reification-viz., presuming that the abstract mathematical entities uncovered by dimension reduction analyses correspond to real psychological entities.
Naturally, the products of dimension reduction techniques can sometimes be interpreted realistically instead of as mere instruments for summarizing high dimensional data. To do so scientists need to bring their broader empirical knowledge to bear on the interpretation of the dimensions of the lower-dimensional space. In the present context, this means that a purely bottom-up approach to cognitive ontology revision is unlikely to succeed: Some other information beyond the activation of brain areas across a range of tasks and their dimension reduction is needed to interpret the resulting dimensions realistically. Perhaps it is also worth noting that establishing the predictive validity of neural personalities does not justify understanding them realistically.
Anderson's approach to cognitive ontology revision is not the only one to fall prey to this reification objection; in fact, we speculate that in general purely bottom-up cognitive ontology revisions commit the error of reification (e.g., Poldrack et al., 2009 ). Such approaches must reduce the very high-dimensional space defined by the number of voxels considered in order to identify cognitive constructs defined solely by brain activation patterns. Doing so probably requires using techniques whose product cannot be interpreted realistically. In our opinion, the reification objection reveals a fundamental shortcoming of bottom-up cognitive ontology revision.
